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The paper suggests a new test for rent-sharing in the U. S. labor market.
Using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector, it shows that a rise in
a sector's profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long-run level
of wages in that sector. The paper controls for workers' characteristics, for indus-
try fixed effects, and for unionism. Lester's range of wages is estimated, for rent-
sharing reasons alone, at approximately 24 percent of the mean wage.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the oldest questions in economics is that of whether
the market for labor can be represented satisfactorily by a stan-
dard competitive model. The importance of this question, which
has implications for macroeconomics as well as for labor econom-
ics, has stimulated both controversy and much research. This pa-
per blends microeconomic data on wages with industrial data on
profits. It produces a new test of the competitive market hypothe-
sis. Contrary to the implications of textbook theory, pay determi-
nation appears to exhibit elements of rent-sharing.'
In a prominent early attack on traditional analysis, Slichter
[1950] argued that a competitive model fails to explain the empir-
ical evidence that apparently homogeneous types of employees
earn significantly different amounts in different industries. His
data, drawn from the U. S. manufacturing sector, showed that
wages appeared to be positively correlated with various measures
of the employer's ability to pay. Slichter concluded that this corre-
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1. A paper by Allen [1993] finds that, after controlling for industry fixed ef-
fects, industry price-cost margins come in negative in a log wage equation. An
interesting and relatively neglected paper is Sparks and Wilton [1971], which
argues, using a form of micro Phillips curve, that there are effects from the level
of profits upon wage change. Hamermesh [1970] finds no robust effect from
profitability. Abowd [1989] is not inconsistent with the results given here, but
is concerned with a different issue, namely, the efficiency of bargaining and the
consequences for profits of changes in labor costs.
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lation provided prima facie evidence against a conventional com-
petitive model. Recent research into this issue by Dickens and
Katz [1987], Krueger and Summers [1987, 1988], and Katz and
Summers [1989] has reached the same conclusions using better
data than were available in Slichter's time.
These studies show that there are unexplained industry
wage differentials and, in some cases, examine the correlation
between wage levels and industry profitability. Although sugges-
tive, the results are open to a number of criticisms. One is that
the apparent pay/profit correlation may be caused by unobserv-
able industry fixed effects. Some industries, for example, may use
a technology that requires both high pay and a high rate of return
on physical capital. A second is that early studies failed to control
for employees' personal characteristics. An ideal data set would
both have a panel element and provide controls for workers' char-
acteristics. There are apparently no data sources of this kind.
Related work, occasionally with panel data, has been done on
European labor markets. This includes research by, for example,
Blanchilower, Oswald, and Garrett [1990]; Beckerman and Jen-
kinson [1990]; Carruth and Oswald [1989]; Holmlund and Zet-
terberg [1991]; Denny and Machin [19911; Hildreth and Oswald
[1992]; and Nickell and Wadhwani [19901.2 All find evidence for
some kind of ability-to-pay effect upon wages. While most of these
do not rest upon cross-section regressions, each draws upon data
sets from highly unionized economies. Thus, in such data a rejec-
tion of the competitive model might be viewed as empirically use-
ful but theoretically unsurprising. The microeconometric work on
rent-sharing of Christofides and Oswald [1992] and Abowd and
Lemieux [1993] is among the first to find effects from profitability
after controlling for fixed effects, but, being based upon Canadian
union contracts, is open to a similar criticism. Moreover, these
two studies are unable to control for employees' educational
characteristics.
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine whether, in
U. S. manufacturing industry, there is evidence that wages de-
pend upon the employer's ability to pay. A second purpose of the
paper is to argue that the existence of a positive correlation be-
tween wages and profitability does not automatically disprove
2. A currently popular European approach is to think of pay as determined
by a mixture of internal pressure (from profits) and external pressure (from out-
side unemployment). Early work includes Carruth and Oswald [1987, 19891 and
Blanchflower and Oswald [1988], and the microeconometric work cited in the text.
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competitive theory. The Appendix derives three models in which
a positive wage-profit correlation is to be expected; two of these
models do not have noncompetitive or rent-sharing features. The
paper points out that it is a long-run correlation that would shed
doubt on the competitive model.
Using various models, Section II discusses interactions be-
tween wages and profits. Sections III and IV contain the empir-
ical results. U. S. manufacturing earnings equations are
estimated with a data set constructed by merging CPS data from
1964-1985 with information on two-digit industry profitability
over the same period. This method creates a form of panel. Sec-
tion V summarizes the paper's conclusions, and the Appendix de-
scribes theoretical results and the data.
II. MODELS OF THE WAGE-PROFIT CORRELATION
The textbook model of a competitive labor market implies
that firms are wage-takers whose profitability will not affect the
wage that they offer to homogeneous employees. This is the as-
sumption of an infinitely elastic supply of labor. It implies that a
highly profitable company will pay the same for a given class of
labor as a relatively unprofitable company.
The textbook atomistic model, however, could be a useful one
for the study of the grain market while simultaneously be a mis-
leading one for the study of the market for people's labor. There
are at least three other ways to think about the theory of pay and
profits. The first is a bargaining framework in which rents are
divided between the firm and its employees. The second is a com-
petitive model in which the short-run supply curve of labor slopes
upward. The third is a contract model in which risk-sharing oc-
curs. Under each of these, there may be a link from profitability
to pay.
The paper's Appendix provides proofs to the following.
1. In a bargaining model with rent-sharing, there is a posi-
tive partial correlation between wages and profit-per-employee,
and a negative partial correlation between wages and unemploy-
ment. These are long-run correlations in the sense that they exist
in equilibrium. Intuitively, the workers appropriate some of the
firm's surplus.
2. In a competitive model, given demand shocks and a posi-
tively sloped labor supply function, there may be a positive short-
run correlation between wages and profits. Intuitively, this is the
 at U
niversity of Stirling on N
ovem
ber 21, 2012
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
230	 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
result of temporary frictions taking the firm up a labor supply
curve. There may also be a positive correlation between wages
and profit-per-employee: a sufficient condition for this is that the
elasticity of labor demand be less than unity. There is no long-
run relation between wages and profit variables.
3. In a labor contract model (with symmetric information) in
which both workers and the firm are risk averse, profits and
wages are positively correlated. Intuitively, the two parties share
in the good times and the bad times. The elasticity of wages with
respect to profits equals the ratio of the parties' relative risk-
aversion parameters.
The remainder of the paper is an attempt to confront these
different theoretical hypotheses with data from the United
States. It tests the competitive model's prediction that, in the
long run, wages are independent of firms' profitability. Because
no suitable matched microeconomic data exist—reporting infor-
mation both about U. S. employees and their employers—the pa-
per splices together microeconomic and industry-level data.
III. DATA AND RESULTS
The analysis draws upon information on approximately
200,000 full-time full-year workers in U. S. manufacturing indus-
try All part-time workers have been deleted. The data are from
the March tapes of the Current Population Survey (CPS), and
cover the years 1964 to 1985.3 Means and standard deviations are
given in the Appendix.
The paper estimates simplified versions of a wage equation
(derived in the Appendix) of the form,
1 – 4iln
Here the equilibrium wage may be thought of as determined by
a combination of external and internal forces. External forces are
captured by the function c(w°,b,U), where w° is the going wage
in other sectors of the economy, b is a person's level of income
when unemployed, and U is the unemployment rate among work-
3. The earnings data are taken from the 1965 to 1986 Current Population
Surveys. Individuals are asked to report their earnings in the previous year. Thus,
for example, 1964 earnings are derived from the 1965 CPS. The use of an unbal-
anced panel was necessitated because of various coding differences, across years,
for the industry variables.
(1) w	 c(w°,h,U) + 	szto 	rr
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ers of the type employed by the firm. Internal forces are captured
by profit-per-employee, win. Workers' relative bargaining power
is 4)/1 — 4).
Profits are, of course, endogenous. Therefore, in estimating a
function where the equilibrium wage is determined by the level
of profit-per-employee, it is necessary to bear in mind the simul-
taneity between profitability and pay. There are two ways to try
to handle the problem. First, if shocks to profits take time to be
passed on in greater remuneration, it might be possible to treat
the equation structure as recursive. On this view, movements in
profitability in the past would be treated as predetermined. The
appropriate structure for estimation would then be to regress
wages on lagged values of profits. The second possible approach
is to find a good instrumental variable. If a demand shock p. were
observable to the econometrician, there would, in principle, be no
difficulty. Because p. should not enter the wage equation except
through its influence upon win, it would be a suitable instrument
for profit-per-employee in a wage equation. In reality, it is diffi-
cult to find persuasive measures of the exogenous 11 shocks that
cause the changes in product prices, so this route cannot easily
be exploited. What is feasible, however, is to gather data on cost
shocks, which in the real world may be more readily observable,
and to use those as an instrument. Experiments are performed
here using movements in the cost of energy, which, particularly
because over this period it was subject to the unpredictability of
oil prices, and because it should not enter directly into a wage
equation, may be a suitable instrument. These experiments pro-
duce the same general conclusion as the lags produce, but with
less precision.
The paper examines three types of equations. First, micro-
econometric earnings functions are estimated. These use data on
all the workers in the sample who were both full-time and worked
for the full year. The equations show well-determined effects on
pay from the level of profits in the industry However, there is a
difficulty when combining an independent variable that has only
a few hundred observations with a dependent variable that has
a quarter of a million observations. Moulton [1986] and others
have pointed out that with common group errors the t-statistics
in these kinds of micro equations tend to be artificially large.
Moreover, this estimation is likely to be unreliable because of so-
called industry fixed effects. The second step in the paper is to
compress the data into a panel of cell means (that is, average
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TABLE I
MICRO LOG EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR U. S. MANUFACTURING, 1964-1985
(1)	 (2)
Weekly earnings	 Hourly earnings
Log unemployment U,	 —.1340	 —.1314
(38.35)	 (36.43)
Profit-per-employee ('Ir/n), .0041
(20.89)
.0038
(18.76)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Personal controls Yes Yes
R2 .6294 .5965
DF 202557 202343
N 202611 202397
F 6490 5647
The dependent variable w is the natural logarithm of the employee's earnings. Industry unemployment
U is also in natural logarithms. Profit-per-employee, win, is in levels. Personal control variables are as fol-
lows: (1) experience and its square, (2) years of schooling, (3) four marital status dummies, (4) two race
dummies, (5) private sector dummy, (6) gender dummy, (7) 20 region dummies, and (8) a constant
The sample, here and in all later tables, consists of full-time full-year workers only. Estimation is by
OLS.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source. Current Population Surveys: Uniform March files and the NBER Productivity Database.
values for each industry for each year). Estimation on this sample
satisfies Moulton's condition that the level of aggregation should
be the same on both sides of the regression equation. It also helps
guard against measurement error in individual observations.
Third, the paper reestimates using the method of papers such as
Dickens and Katz [1987]. This approach takes the coefficients on
industry dummies from a first-stage raicroeconometric wage
equation and uses them to form the dependent variable in a
second-stage regression. That second regression uses industry
variables, such as profitability, as regressors.
Table I is a cross-section benchmark. It reports equations in
which the dependent variable is the logarithm of workers' weekly
and hourly earnings. For details of how these earnings variables
are constructed, see the Data Appendix. Columns (1) and (2) of
Table I reveal that U. S. weekly and hourly remuneration is
higher in sectors where profit-per-head is higher. The estimated
equations include a dummy variable for each year to control for
all economywide movements from 1964 to 1985. The equations
also include a conventional set of demographic and educational
variables for the individuals in the sample. This is to guard
against the possibility that highly profitable sectors pay well
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merely because they employ people with unusually high levels of
human capital. Because of occasional negative values, the profit-
ability variable is not entered as a logarithm. The mean of profit-
per-employee in the sample is 9.73. Given the coefficient of 0.0041
on 7r/n, therefore, the (simple cross-section) profit-per-head elas-
ticity of wages is approximately 0.04. The unemployment elastic-
ity of pay is —0.13. These estimates are only a first pass at the
problem. First, they may understate the true size of profit-effects
upon pay, because they ignore the possible simultaneity bias
caused by the tendency for high wages to lead to low profitability.
Second, they may overstate the statistical significance of profits,
because it is probable that the standard errors on 7r/n in such
micro equations are biased downward.
The principal result of the paper is captured in Table II. Esti-
mation here is on industry cell means, and so can be thought of
as being performed on a panel of industries. The dependent vari-
able is the logarithm of the average level of hourly earnings in
each industry in the relevant year. The independent variables are
the average level (in each industry in each year) of work experi-
ence, years of schooling, marital status, racial mix, proportion of
employees working in the private sector, and percent of workers
who are female. These variables' values are calculated from the
Uniform March CPS tapes. The regressions in Table II also in-
clude the industry unemployment rate U; lagged values of the
industry profit-per-employee, ir/n; a lagged dependent variable;
year dummies, and a set of industry dummies to capture
industry-level fixed effects. Lagged unemployment contributed
nothing extra. The lagged dependent variable could be instru-
mented here, but Nickell [1981] bias is slight with such a long
panel. The reported regressions use an unbalanced panel of 16
industries by 22 years, giving approximately 300 observations in
all. Details of the industries covered are given in the Appendix.
The industry unemployment and profit data were merged from
external sources (further explanation is in Sanfey [19921). The
estimation uses unweighted data.4
Table II's findings are consistent with rent-sharing theory.
Increases in profits feed through into permanently higher levels
4. There is support in the literature for such an approach. For example, Dick-
ens [1990] shows that individual error terms are likely to be correlated due to
group-specific error components, which means that weighting by, say, the square
root of group size is inappropriate. Moreover, we experimented with weighted re-
gressions, and the results were the same.
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TABLE II
HOURLY LOG EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR U. S. MANUFACTURING, 1964-1985,
USING CELL MEANS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log ET, —.0122 —.0129 —.0113 —.0091
(Trin)t- i —(.0003241) (.000.9224)
(0.84) (0.68)
(0.80) (1.22)
(ir/n),, .0023 .0054
(0.75) (2.77)
(illn),_, (.20.057 .0071
Log w,_,. .2393 .2375 .2505 (.32.45062)
(3.83) (3.86) (3.89) (3.72)
Personal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .9941 .9946 .9943 .9941
DF 225 257 242 227
N 295 327 311 295
F 550.80 889.60 619.35 570.36
Personal control variables are as follows: (1) experience, (2) years of schooling, (3) four marital status
variables, (4) two race variables, (5) private sector variable, (6) percent female, and (7) a constant. All unem-
ployment rates U and the dependent variable w (hourly earnings) are in natural logarithms. Profit-per-
employee, it/n, is in levels.
All variables, including the dependent variable, are measured as the mean of the observations in a year/
industry cell.
(-statistics are in parentheses.
Source. Current Population Surveys: Uniform March files and the NBER Productivity Database.
of pay. Various specifications are set out in columns (1) to (4) of
Table II. The largest coefficient, 0.0071, is that on profits of three
years earlier; columns (2) to (4) show that the size of the arin coef-
ficient rises as the length of lag increases. These facts are consis-
tent with the idea that simultaneity bias is likely to be less at
comparatively long lags.
The profit-effects in Table II are large. As noted, the mean of
profit-per-employee is 9.73, with a standard deviation of 7.43.
The level of profit-per-employee at the tenth percentile of the
profit distribution is 4.07, at the fiftieth percentile is 8.03, and at
the ninety-ninth percentile is 44.41. The long-run impact of
profit-per-employee, 'en, can be calculated from Table II column
(1)'s general specification by summing the three profit coefficients
and adjusting for the lagged dependent variable. The long-run
coefficient on profit-per-employee is 0.008. The elasticity is there-
fore 0.08. This implies that in the long run a doubling of profit-
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ability in a sector would, after some years, be associated with a
rise in pay of approximately 8 percent. In the short run, workers
in a more profitable industry would have greater wage rises than
employees elsewhere. The bulk of these wage rises would, ac-
cording to the table, come through by the third year after a burst
of profits. The effect of profitability upon pay is approximately
double that estimated from the earlier simple cross-section equa-
tion of Table I. The long-run unemployment elasticity of pay is
poorly defined in Table II, which contrasts with the earlier Table
I and the commonly found elasticity of —0.1. Blanchflower and
Oswald [1990, 19941 contain a summary of recent estimates.
An elasticity of 0.08 has important consequences, because
profitability is one of the most volatile series studied by econo-
mists. Consider the primary metals sector, which has the data
set's minimum single value of ir/n, of —1.39 in 1983 (thousands
of 1972 dollars). Profits-per-employee in that sector was 11.06 in
1980. It fell to 5.21 in 1982, and it rose from a negative 1983
value to reach 3.5 by 1985. The data thus show that large move-
ments, such as quadrupling of profitability, are not uncommon in
this sector. Some industries, of course, are stabler. The fooli sec-
tor, for example, sees ir/n vary over the years of the data set from
11.04 to 19.76. Nevertheless, an examination of the 22-by-16 ma-
trix of data points on industries' profits suggests, consistent with
anecdotal observation, that major fluctuations in profitability are
commonplace.
If the width of a distribution can be thought of as four stan-
dard deviations, the estimates make possible a calculation of the
spread of pay caused by the dispersion of profits across sectors.
Using Lester's [1952] early terminology, the "range" of wages due
to rent-sharing in U. S. manufacturing is then approximately 24
percent of the mean wage (this number emerges from multiplying
0.08 times 4 times 7.43/9.73). It seems that a quarter of the in-
equality in American pay packets may be the result of rents.
Although this estimate of the size of rent-sharing is a sub-
stantial one, some recent work (reviewed in Oswald [1995]) has
argued that the true effect is even greater. The first paper of this
kind was Abowd and Lemieux [1993]. The authors show that in-
strumenting a quasi-rent variable in a wage equation causes its
coefficient to rise tenfold. The result is an elasticity so large that
it implies that approximately all the variation in the raw wage
data is due to rents. If the authors are right, our estimates may
be an understatement of the extent of rent-sharing.
The lagged dependent variable of Table II, which is in log
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TABLE III
HOLTRLY LOG EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR U. S. MANUFACTURING, 1964-1985, USING
INDUSTRY DUMMIES FROM FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log U, -.0278 -.0254 -.0284 -.0291 -.0245 -.0196
(2.70) (2.51) (2.91) (3.16) (2.22) (1.77)
(Tr/n), .0020 .0030
(1.36) (1.60)
(Tr/n),_, .0005 .0023
(0.25) (1.68)
(ir/n),-2 -.0000 .0025
(0.01) (1.82)
err/n),-3 .0028 .0030
(1.57) (2.26)
Log 10,-1 .3557 .4295 .4264 .3572 .4411 .4337
(6.58) (8.56) (7.68) (6.66) (8.90) (8.45)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumented win No No No No No Yes
R2 .9200 .9146 .9123 .9200 .9143 .9125
DF 256 288 273 258 288 268
N 295 327 311 295 327 306
F 77.51 8L20 76.80 82.42 80.91 75.49
Personal control variables included in the first-stage regressions for each year are as follows: (1) experi-
ence, (2) years of schooling, (3) four marital status variables, (4) two race variables, (5) private sector vari-
able, (6) percent female, and (7) a constant. All unemployment rates U and the dependent variable w (hourly
earnings) are in natural logarithms. Profit-per-employee, win, is in levels. All independent variables are
measured as the mean of the observations in a year/industry cell. Instruments in column (6) for (irin), were
(x/n),_, and current and one-year lagged energy share of total costs.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source. Current Population Surveys: Uniform March files and the NBER Productivity Database.
form, has a coefficient of approximately 0.2. This is low by the
standards of work on pay determination (a simple Phillips Curve
might be taken to imply a coefficient of unity). It seems that, as
might be hoped, most of the autoregression often found in wage
equations is picked up here by the variables for workers' charac-
teristics and by the industry-specific fixed effects. This is even
truer in a fuller sample (not reported) that includes part-timers.
In such a sample the lagged dependent variable's coefficient
drops below 0.1.
Table III switches to an alternative estimation method. Here
the dependent variable is the industry dummy from a microeco-
nometric earnings equation. The results are similar to those in
the earlier table, but are not as well defined. The elasticity of pay
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TABLE IV
ANNUAL LOG EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR U. S. MANUFACTURING, 1964-1985,
USING CELL MEANS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (It —.0108 —.0104 —.0095 —.0099
(0.90) (0.92) (0.86) (0.88)
(ir/n),_, —.0015 .0020
(0.68) (1.27)
(len)t-2 .0031 .0042
(1.24) (2.63)
(ir/n),_3 .0026 .0040
(1.22) (2.44)
Log w1_1 .3979 .4005 .4045 .4006
(6.44) (6.89) (6.67) (6.49)
Personal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .9960 .9965 .9962 .9960
DF 225 257 242 227
N 295 327 311 295
F 820.45 1047.01 943.81 846.63
Personal control variables are as follows: (1) experience, (2) years of schooling, (3) four marital status
variables, (4) two race variables, (5) private sector variable, (6) percent female, and (7) a constant. AR unem-
ployment rates U and the dependent variable w (annual earnings) are in natural logarithms. Profit-per-
employee, ir/n, is in levels.
All variables, including the dependent variable, are measured as the mean of the observations in a year/
industry cell.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: Current Population Surveys: Uniform March files and the NBER Productivity Database.
with respect to profitability is slightly smaller at approximately
0.05. Columns (5) and (6) of Table III give equations where cur-
rent IT/n is, and is not, instrumented. Although instrumenting
causes the coefficient to increase from 0.002 to 0.003, the preci-
sion of the estimates is low. Table IV provides another variant,
using annual earnings, and reveals that again the effect of profits
takes time to work through into employees' remuneration. Here
the long-run profit elasticity of pay is approximately 0.06. As with
the hourly earnings equations, a lag on profits works best.
Table V moves to subsamples that break the data down by
the proportion of unionized employees. These data were extracted
from the NBER Trade and Immigration Databases (see Abowd
[19911). The motivation for this is that the results for the full
sample contain some unionized sectors, and it might be thought
that the paper's rent-sharing finding is being driven simply by
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TABLE V
HOURLY LOG EARNINGS EQUATIONS BY UNION STATUS, 1964-1985
(1)
Low-union
(2)
High-union
(3)
Low-union
(4)
High-union
Second-stage regressions Cell means
Log Ut .0182 -.0503 .0359 -.0300
(0.96) (5.20) (1.44) (2.07)
(7r/n),_3 .0059 .0014 .0084 .0024
(2.76) (0.90) (2.96) (1.03)
Log w .3710 .3231 .4349 .3277
(5.29) (3.78) (6.03) (3.57)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal controls 1st stage 1st stage Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .9195 .8839 .9930 .9932
DF 135 102 135 102
N 165 130 165 130
F 53.21 28.76 657.88 549.43
Personal control variables included in the second-stage regressions for columns (1) and (2) for each year
are as follows: (1) experience, (2) years of schooling, (3) four marital status variables, (4) two race variables,
(5) private sector variable, (6) percent female, and (7) a constant. Personal control variables in columns (3)
and (4) are averages for full-time workers across industry/year cells and are as follows: (1) experience (2)
years of schooling, (3) four marital status variables, (4) two race variables, (5) private sector variable, (6)
percent female, and (7) a constant. All unemployment rates U and the dependent variable w (hourly earn-
ings) are in natural logarithms. Profit-per-employee, IT/n, is in levels.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
The low-union sector is defined as the nine industries with below the average ((36.7 percent) overall
union density for the whole group of industries over the period 1964-1985. The low-union industries are as
follows with average union density over the period in parentheses: (1) Textiles (14.5 percent), (2) Apparel,
(30.5 percent), (3) Lumber and wood (25.3 percent), (4) Furniture (25.1 percent), (5) Printing (22.9 percent),
(6) Chemicals (28.4 percent), (7) Rubber (33.7 percent), (8) Machinery not electrical (3L7 percent), and (9)
Electrical machinery (31.3 percent). The high-union sector is defined as the seven industries with above
average union density: (1) Food and tobacco (39.0 percent), (2) Paper (52.3 percent), (3) Stone, clay, and glass
(45.7 percent), (4) Primary metals (60.0 percent), (5) Motor vehicles (67.8 percent), (6) Transport (40.5
percent).
Source. Current Population Surveys: (a) Uniform March tapes, (b) the NBER Productivity database, and
(c) The NBER Immigration and Trade database.
that portion of the data. Such a hypothesis can be rejected. As the
four columns of Table V reveal, the evidence for rent-sharing is
even stronger in low-unionism industries. Although this proce-
dure inevitably reduces the number of observations (n = 165 in
the first column of Table V), the results are robust to different
ways of cutting the data.
IV. CHECKING OTHER INTERPRETATIONS
It is not easy to see how the estimates of Tables Ito V could
be compatible with the competitive labor market framework. The
main possibility appears to be the one discussed earlier in the
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paper, namely, that temporary frictions could induce a short-term
positive correlation between profits and pay. But that appears to
be contradicted by the finding here of a steady-state effect.
Perhaps the only other route would be to argue that the wage
equation is a misspecified inverted labor demand curve. With a
Cobb-Douglas production function, for example, profit maximiza-
tion can generate a positive association between w and win. How-
ever, the significance of lagged profit levels back to t-3 is difficult
to square with the idea that the wage equation might mistakenly
be identifying an inverted labor demand relationship. Moreover,
total profits also works as an alternative regressor (results are
available from the authors), which, because a maximum profit
function is declining in the wage, is further reason to doubt the
objection.
Experiments were done to check robustness. Allowing for
more complex autoregressive equations (available upon request
from the authors), using other lagged profit-per-employee terms,
leaves the conclusions unchanged.
The labor contract model of equations (19)—(25) in the Appen-
dix offers an alternative interpretation of the data. It is one that
falls in the gap between competitive theory and a rent-sharing
model. Equation (25) is an equilibrium relation, capturing how
wages vary in the contract as demand changes, and is potentially
consistent with the fact that the tables seem to reveal long-run
effects from profit shocks. This model has no supernormal ex-
pected returns, and so it differs from the rent-sharing framework.
Potential disadvantages are that the predicted wage correlation
is not with profit-per-employee but instead with total profits, that
long lags are perhaps hard to understand, and that it is not clear
why wages should react to industry unemployment.
The most famous objection to the kind of rent-sharing analy-
sis proposed in this paper is that the true model is a competitive
one with slow adjustment. Reder's [1962] attack on the work of
Slichter and his contemporaries helped to turn an earlier litera-
ture away from noncompetitive views and back toward the com-
petitive framework. His main point was that empirical work had
failed to control for employment fluctuations, so that the tests
ostensibly favoring rent-sharing might merely be revealing a
temporary move up the labor supply curve in booming industries.
"None of the studies to which reference has been made has at-
tempted to control against these possibilities" [Reder 1962, p.
289]. In consequence, Reder believed, an observed correlation be-
tween wages and firms' ability-to-pay was unconvincing support
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for a noncompetitive approach. One objection to the Reder view
is that papers like Katz and Summers [1989] have shown that
industry wage differentials persist over very long periods of time
and so are not plausibly explained by temporary employment
movements. A different test can be done by incorporating into the
regression equations a set of current and lagged employment
variables. If profitability is acting—as in a competitive frame-
work with gradual adjustment—simply as a proxy for move-
ments along a labor supply curve, the inclusion of employment
and its rate of change should destroy the statistical significance
of a variable like ii/n. When this inclusion is done, however, the
profit terms are unaffected.
Experiments were also performed with data on 450 four-digit
industries from 1963 to 1985. These took production workers'
hourly earnings as the dependent variable. They could not control
for employees' characteristics, but did allow for year and industry
dummies. Again there were significant positive effects from
profit-per-employee (these results are available upon request
from the authors).
To recapitulate, consider the textbook model after an exoge-
nous rise in demand for the products of industry j. In a competi-
tive labor market with frictions, profits 71,1 and wages will at
first rise together. The correlation is induced by the outward shift
in the demand curve for labor in industry j. However, workers of
a given skill are then rewarded more highly in industry j than in
other sectors of the economy. The resulting inward migration of
workers must, by competitive logic, eventually eliminate the
wage gain. A blip in profits, therefore, can have no long-run effect
on pay. This prediction of the canonical model seems to be system-
atically violated by the data. Even within a subsample of indus-
tries with little unionism, there appears to be evidence of rent-
sharing5 in U. S. wage determination.6
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper tests for the existence of rent-sharing in the U. S.
labor market. Controlling for industry fixed effects, and a range
5. An earlier version of the paper established that switching to a sample with
part-time workers makes no difference to this conclusion.
6. These results are consistent with some reported recently—though without
educational and similar controls—in Hildreth and Oswald [1992] for Britain and
Sanfey [1993] for the United States, and also with the spirit of Holmlund and
Zetterberg's [1991] conclusions for various nations including the United States.
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of personal and compositional variables, the paper shows that
changes in workers' remuneration follow earlier movements in
profitability.7 When firms become more prosperous, workers even-
tually receive some of the gains. This is the central prediction of
noncompetitive theories in which rents are divided between firms
and employees. Explaining how such sharing can happen in the
absence of unions is a theoretical challenge.
The paper goes on to consider potential flaws in this kind of
empirical test. The analysis shows that wages and profits may
exhibit comovement in a variety of circumstances:
(i) in a modified competitive model where, because of fric-
tions, labor supply temporarily slopes upward;
(ii) in an optimal contract model in which workers and the
employer are risk averse;
(iii) in a bargaining framework in which there are noncom-
petitive rents.8
Discriminating among these three is difficult, but the first model
seems inconsistent with the paper's finding of a steady-state rela-
tionship between remuneration and profit-per-employee.
Changes in industries' levels of prosperity have large effects
upon workers' remuneration. The elasticity of wages with respect
to profit-per-employee is 0.08. Lester's [1952] "range" of pay is
then, for rent-sharing reasons alone, approximately 24 percent of
the mean wage. According to this calculation, a quarter of the
inequality8 among the Americans in our sample is due to the exis-
tence of rents.
THEORETICAL APPENDIX
Model 1
Consider a bargaining model in which wages are determined
as if by a Nash problem in which (I) is the bargaining power of
employees. Write this maximization problem as
7. There are other sources of information on a wage-profit correlation, and
some industrial relations researchers are likely to see these results as establish-
ing statistically a relationship that they have observed many times in actual
wage-setting. Blanchfiower and Oswald [1988] document direct questionnaire evi-
dence of this type. Field experiments like those in Bazerman [1985] point in the
same direction. For a recent survey of explanations for industry wage differen-
tials, see Groshen [1991].
8. Recent work by Macleod and Malcomson [1993] can also generate a wage-
profit relationship.
9. Using the simplest range measure of inequality.
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(1)	 maximize 4)logt [u(w ) — u(F.u)]n} + (1 — 4))log Tr,
where u(w) is a single worker's utility from wage w, ii) is the wage
available from temporary work in the event of a breakdown in
bargaining, n is employment, and 'Tr is profits. This formulation
relies on the assumption that in the event of bargaining delay the
firm earns zero profit and the worker receives ii.). By the choice of
units, the variable n is also the probability of employment. Define
profits as f(n) — wn, where f is a concave revenue function. The
maximization's solution must be such that each side earn at least
what is available as an outside option.
At an interior optimum, the following first-order conditions
hold:
4)u '(w) 	1 — 4)
[u(w) — u(z.T)]n	 IT
4)(3)	 n: + (1— 4))[r(n) — wi
n it	
= O.
Rewrite the first of these as
u(w) — u(Tv)  (  4) 	'Tr
u'(w)	 k1 — 4)) n •
This can be simplified by using
(5) u(i—v):—.." u(w) + (i—v — w)u'(w)
to produce
(6) w :-.-- w + (  4) ) IT .
1 - 4) n
This equation is simple but useful. It shows that, to a first-order
approximation, the equilibrium wage is determined by the out-
side wage available in the event of a temporary dispute in bar-
gaining, the relative bargaining strength of the two sides, and
the level of profit-per-employee.
Equation (6) is more general than might at first be apparent.
Because it stems only from the first of the two first-order condi-
tions, equation (6) is true independently of the exact nature of
the employment function. In particular, given efficiency, it does
(2)
(4)
 at U
niversity of Stirling on N
ovem
ber 21, 2012
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
WAGES, PROFITS, AND RENT-SHARING	 243
not depend on whether employment is fixed along a labor demand
curve (which would result from efficient bargaining under locally
horizontal indifference curves) or an upward-sloping contract
curve. Equation (6) would not, however, be generated by the Nick-
ell and Wadhwani [1990] version of a labor-demand model. That
model relies upon an unexplained inefficiency and would include
one extra term for the elasticity of labor demand.
A conventional assumption about the underlying determi-
nants of the outside temporary wage, is that it can be de-
scribed by the function c(w°, b, U), where w° is the going wage
in other sectors of the economy, b is the level of income when
unemployed, and U is the unemployment rate among workers of
the type employed by the firm. A natural interpretation of the
algebra is that th is expected income and U determines the proba-
bility of receiving b rather than w°. Written in full, therefore, the
equilibrium wage is
(7)	 w c(w°,b,U) +
In a regression equation for (7), estimated on longitudinal data,
year dummies are likely to capture w° and b, leaving industry
unemployment U and employer profit-per-employee irhz as the
key explanatory variables. A separate industry variable for w° is
not included explicitly in the later regressions because a cell-
mean industry wage is used as the dependent variable. Equation
(7) corresponds to the regressions in the paper in which profits-
per-employee is an independent variable.
Unlike the next model, this theoretical structure does not im-
pose an assumption of zero profit in equilibrium. It seems natural
to allow nonzero profits in a bargaining model. One weakness
should be noted: why new firms fail to enter the sector then re-
mains unexplained.
Model 2
At the other extreme from a bargaining model lies competi-
tive theory. It is of interest to examine [Hildreth and Oswald
19921 whether this can imply a positive comovement of wages
and profitability.
Imagine demand shocks hitting the economy. Because the fo-
cus is the relationship between wages and profits, it is convenient
to define a maximum profit function,
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(8) = max[1.4*(n) — wn],
where employment n is chosen to maximize the difference be-
tween revenue and labor costs, and f(n) is a concave production
function, p, is a demand shock (or output price) variable, and w is
the wage. The function 71-(11,w) is convex and homogeneous of de-
gree one in the prices and w. The later analysis assumes that
the function is twice differentiable.
Assume that ir(p.,w) represents the profit of the representa-
tive firm within an industry By an appropriate choice of units,
the long-run equilibrium level of profits can if necessary be set as
= 0. This is the usual convention that profits be written
net of some required return to the entrepreneur who runs the
firm.
In this framework there is a labor demand curve defined by
the derivative of the maximum profit function with respect to
wages. Assume that there is also a labor supply function 1(w),
which may be upward-sloping in the short run, but which is hori-
zontal in the long run.
It is not sufficient, for later purposes, to appeal to a conven-
tional demand/supply picture, because profits cannot be read
from such a diagram. But a simple algebraic argument is as fol-
lows. Equilibrium in this market is given by the equation,
(9) = 1(w),
where the function on the left is the demand curve for labor, and
the function on the right is the supply curve of labor. The differen-
tial of equation (9) is
(10) — d l'(w)dw
so that the relationship between demand shocks and wages is
dw	 wp,
/'(w) +
showing that wages rise in a boom.
Because the profit function is homogeneous of degree one, ir
can be written as
(12) = 11,7r+ W1T.
Differentiating,
(13) = wrr + W1T +	 .
0,
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Cancelling terms and rearranging,
(14) irlyw — — II < O.
irwp.	 w
To establish the reduced-form relationship between wages
and profits, differentiate throughout the profit function 1r(11,w)
to give
dir	 dp.,(15) = Tr 	  + irdw 	 dw w
(16) _ — ir p[li (w) + 1.r.]
Ir.,. + IT.
	'Tr /w)	 FIAT(17) =	 1.4 1(	 + 	 +
w
where equations (11) and (14) have been used to substitute terms.
Note that c/R/dw is simply the inverse of the derivative of wages
with respect to the exogenous demand shock.
The right-hand side of equation (17) is nonnegative. It is
strictly positive if either supernormal profits are being made
(IT > 0) or the labor supply curve is strictly increasing. To check
the former, note that, by homogeneity, IT > 0 implies and is im-
plied by
(18) 1-12LET 4. lc > 0.
w
The latter follows from /'(w) > 0, and the fact that ir(11,,w) is in-
creasing in the demand shock il, and has a negative cross-partial
derivative.
Equation (17) shows that wages and profits are positively
correlated. A sufficient condition for wages and profit-per-
employee to move together is that the elasticity of labor demand
be less than unity. The algebra is omitted.
Model 3
The final model is a generalization of the Baily [1974] and
Azariadis [1975] optimal contract framework. In this the firm and
workers are assumed to reach an implicit contract in which
wages are set to provide efficient "insurance" against random de-
mand shocks. Although the original articles assumed that firms
are risk neutral, and thus obtained the result that wages should
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be rigid, that assumption can be generalized to allow the firm to
be averse to risk. The model then predicts a positive correlation
between pay and profitability.
A labor contract model can be represented as the following
maximization problem:
(19) maximize iverr)g(1.04
subject to
(20) f[nu(w) + (1 — n)u(b)]g(11)dg,
(21) ,rr	 if(n) — wn.
The solution is a wage function w(p) defined on demand shocks.
Implicit in the above formulation are the following assumptions.
First, the firm's utility depends upon profits and can be repre-
sented by a concave function v(ir). Second, the worker receives
utility u(w) when employed and u(b) when unemployed. Nor-
malizing the size of the labor pool to unity, the probability of em-
ployment is n and of unemployment 1 — n. Assume that there is
no private unemployment insurance and that b is exogenously
given (in line with the U. S. data reported in Oswald [1986]). De-
mand shocks here follow a probability density function g(p).
Firms must offer their employees the market level of expected
utility.
The key first-order conditions are
(22) w(p,): —v Trr) + Xu'(w) = 0
(23) v'(70[1.111(n) — WI + X[u(w) — u(b)] = 0,
where X is a multiplier on the integral constraint (20) and is thus
independent of Equation (22) defines an implicit function link-
ing profits and wages. Differentiating,
(24) dw	 v"('rr)
Xu"(w)'
which is strictly positive if both parties are strictly risk averse, is
undefined if workers are risk neutral, and is zero if firms are risk
neutral. The latter is the well-known case studied by Baily [1974]
and Azariadis [1975].
Assume that workers' relative risk aversion is r and the
firm's relative risk aversion is CI. Then, combining (22) and (24),
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(25) dw 'Tr	 Si
- = - •
chr w r
In other words, the elasticity of wages with respect to profits is
equal to the ratio of the firm's relative risk aversion to the work-
ers' relative risk aversion. Here the firm and its employees choose
to share the risk of demand fluctuations. Wages and profits then
move together.
DATA APPENDIX SAMPLE MEANS (ANT) STANDARD DEVIATIONS) IN $ THOUSANDS
Profit-per-employee
Low-union sample	 9.07
High-union sample	 11.02
All	 9.73
Means in $thousands
ir/n
(6.93)
(8.18)
(7.43)
win
SIC20. Food and kindred products 14.99
SIC22. Textile mill products 4.67
SIC23. Apparel and other textile products 4.40
SIC24. Lumber and wood products 5.41
SIC25. Furniture and fixtures 5.70
SIC26. Paper and allied products 10.67
SIC27. Printing and publishing 8.97
SIC28.	 Chemical and allied products 25.83
SIC30. Rubber and miscellaneous plastics 8.87
SIC32. Stone, clay, and glass products 9.06
SIC33. Primary metals 7.41
SIC34. Fabricated metals 8.11
SIC35. Machinery except electrical 9.46
SIC36. Electric and electronic equipment 8.66
SIC371. Motor vehicles and equipment 12.76
SIC37. Other transportation equipment (excl. SIC371) 8.00
These are all for two-digit industries. Some SIC industries
were omitted from the analysis because of doubts about the con-
sistency of their coding over the period. Means for four-digit data
are available upon request from the authors.
Data Sources and Construction
1. Uniform CPS Files. The data used here were constructed
from the 1964-1986 March files of the Current Population Sur-
vey. In each year the sample was restricted to those individuals
whose main activity in the previous year was as an employee in
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the manufacturing sector. Individuals who were self-employed or
who worked in the service sector were deleted from our sample.
We also deleted all individuals who reported that they were part-
time. Where possible, we defined this as having usual hours of
<30, but for the years 1964-1975, because of changes in defini-
tions across the years, we used self-reports of part-time status
in the subsequent period. As a check, some equations were run
separately for the largest feasible sample of workers (full- + part-
time), and they were very similar to those reported here.
Three dependent variables are used in the paper. They are
total earnings from wages and salaries in the year preceding the
interview, weekly earnings, and hourly earnings. Only usual
weekly hours for the previous year are available in the CPS. Fol-
lowing Katz and Murphy [1992], we use hours worked during the
survey week to measure weekly hours in the previous year. For
individuals who did not work during the survey week, we im-
puted usual weekly hours using the mean of hours worked last
week for individuals of the same sex and same full-time/part-time
status who reported hours worked last week on that year's
survey.
Prior to aggregation, the data by industry and the various
control variables were made consistent across years. In calculat-
ing hourly earnings by cell mean, the earnings data were aligned
with the appropriate year's hours.
2. Profit Variables. The data source for the profit data is the
NBER's Productivity Database, constructed by Gray [1989]. The
database contains annual data for 450 four-digit manufacturing
industries. It uses the 1972 SIC definitions. Data on profits are
not directly available in the data set, so various definitions of real
profits were constructed. To get to the profitability variable used
in the paper (derived from Sanfey's thesis, and termed Profit3c
there), the following three steps have to be gone through. The
final variable, denoted 3c profits, is built up in stages. First, de-
fine a preliminary measure,
(Value Added —Payroll)Profit lc — 	 .
CPI
Value added is essentially equal to the value of shipments minus
cost of materials, but this is adjusted by the change in inventories
and the addition of value added by merchandising operations. Ac-
cordingly, this measure "avoids the duplication in the figure for
value of shipments that results from the use of products of some
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establishments as materials of others" [Census of Manufactures
1987, Appendix Al. Measure lc is akin to the definition of profits
used in Beckerman and Jenkinson [1990] and is a useful starting
point. However, two problems should be noted. First, the method
of valuing inventories changed in 1982 (from any acceptable ac-
counting method to the lower one of cost or market value), so the
data on Value-Added post-1982 may not be strictly comparable to
pre-1982. Second, the measure of payroll excludes "supplemen-
tary labor costs," i.e., legally required expenditures such as social
security contributions and payments to voluntary programs.
The database includes data on capital stocks and invest-
ment. It is possible, therefore, to adjust the above profit measure
for depreciation and the opportunity cost of capital. The data on
capital are already in real (1972) dollars, but the data on invest-
ment are not, so we deflated the series by the investment deflator
provided in the data set. Investment combines spending on struc-
tures and equipment. This means we cannot calculate separate
depreciation rates for these. The overall depreciation rate is
given by
Dept = Capital, — Capital,, + Investment,.
Thus, the new measure of profits, 2c, is
Profit2c = Profitlc — Dep.
Naturally, the last year (1986) is lost when including depreciation
in the calculation.
One last step is required, namely, to adjust for the opportu-
nity cost of capital. Here we define that cost as the product of the
real interest rate and the real capital stock, where the real rate
of interest is defined as the difference between the one-year T-bill
rate (Source: U. S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve:
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941-1970, and Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States (various issues)) and the rate of CPI
inflation. This real rate of interest is often negative, particularly
during the 1970s. The opportunity cost measure of capital is des-
ignated Oppc for short. Then define a variable
Profit3c = Profit2c — Oppc.
By definition, the measure of opportunity cost used here does not
have any industry variation.
In summary, the total profit variable (Sanfey's variable
Profit3c) used in the paper is
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value added — payroll
Tr =	 - real depreciation
CPI
— (real interest rate x real capital stock).
This 3c measure of total profit is divided by employment to get
the ir/n used in the paper's regressions. The resulting "profit-per-
employee" measure may be biased upward because, first, the em-
ployee figures do not include employees working in "auxiliary
units" (e.g., headquarters and support facilities) and, second, the
payroll figures exclude the wages of these workers. There is noth-
ing that can be done about this difficulty. The fixed-effect methods
of the paper may help to nullify it. Further details are given in
Sanfey [1992, Appendix 2] and Gray [1989].
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